Being Good, But With Limits?

In the terms of Sen, I am at a great risk of over-simplifying. This Sen's essay involves much more than my blog represents. Letting everyone know.

“Rights and Agency” is an evaluation done by Amartya Sen on two different moral systems: welfarist consequentialism and constraint-based deontology. He discusses the inadequacies of each of these moral systems and speaks of an alternative approach, the goal rights system. Through this system, our morality is evaluated through agencies that view an action from different perspectives, and our freedoms, both positive and negative, are based on the final analysis of our moral decision.

Welfarist consequentialism is simply based on the social judgments of right or wrong through the consideration of consequences, more specifically, consequences of people’s welfare. All welfarist actions were for the benefit, whether in pleasure, happiness, or desires, of the majority (p 191). Constraint-based deontology determines morality by actions, and not the intentions and consequences that come from that action (p 189). There is no external or internal judgment. It simply is what it is. Sen believes there is too great of a separation of these two moral systems and a moral decision cannot be fully met, as in his example of Ali, the shopkeeper, and his friend Donna, who tries to save him from a bashing (p 191-193). From the welfarist consequentialist point of view, the consequences are more detrimental to the rest of the population for Donna to act to save Ali. From the constrained-based point of view, the act of breaking into someone’s private home is viewed as wrong and immoral. In the end, Donna cannot save Ali morally, regardless of what she does. Because these two moral systems do not create a moral end, so to speak, for Ali cannot be saved form the bashing, Sen’s alternative approach is a goal rights system.

A goal rights system recognizes different characteristics and contexts of a situation so an individual may decide to, and should, act morally. Different states of affairs are looked at by different criteria and the most moral action, in regards to action or inaction (positive and negative freedoms), can be decided on. If Ali was not getting bashed, but only his business was threatened, Donna would have no legitimate moral reason to break other rules, like breaking into Charles’s apartment (p 202). The criteria are based on the perspectives and interpretations of agencies, doers and viewers, with one of a few guidelines in mind: do only if you would let another person the same (p 205).

Why is it that our moral systems have such strict guidelines on what is moral? Without room for interpretation, very few of our actions can be completely moral and beneficiary to all. We must look at the context of the state of affairs, view it from all perspectives, personally and objectively, and decide if the action the situation entails is moral. Sen is right to say that “…considerations to any role [should be made] in outcome judgments” (p 221) and that we have the rights to decide on these considerations. The goal rights system is the acknowledgement of the possibilities of the different orientation of good and wrong.

Justice: Killing Old People & Revealing Sex-Scandals?

In “War and Massacre,” Thomas Nagel examines our ability to justify actions, both on a personal and a national level, through the lenses of absolutism (which focuses on actions), and utilitarianism (which focuses on ends). As an avid news reader and watcher, I could not help but relate Nagel's work to our world's current events. Over the course of the past five years, I have read the news every morning, and watched it in the evening with some consistent frequency. While the names and faces may change with each new day, there remain two unwavering story categories: war and politics.

First, let us discuss war: In an age of increased tension between our country and what seems like the rest of the world, war has been pushed to the forefront of global events. When I read the word “war,” I am, of course, reminded of Iraq--a war justified by some and reprimanded by others. Next, I think of Afghanistan, and our perpetual “war on terror”—8 years after the September 11 tragedy, several worldwide terrorist attacks later, and, as of today, 30,000 more troops committed to the cause—will we ever actually attain desirable results? If the cause is worth pursuing, how should we proceed? Naturally, the controversy and justification of torture is implied when discussing our fight against terror. Can we justify our actions of war and torture without taking accountability for their indirect outcomes (absolutism); or should we focus on creating the greatest outcomes possible, without overt regard to our actions (utilitarianism)?

Nagel presents us with a conundrum to help contextualize the struggle: is it justifiable to bomb an area, thus killing innocent civilians—namely “women, babies and old people”—if we are in fact killing a leading combatant? What if we don’t kill our target, but the civilian causalities cause enemy surrender? For an absolutist, the action of killing is one that ought never to be done; but can killing be justified if it, in turn, creates a greater good? Conversely, can the act of not killing be justified if it in turn causes greater harm? It is clear that the type of person we kill in war becomes increasingly important. There seems to be an unwritten standard of “foul play”—and killing innocent people violates that code.

Next, Nagel provides an example of a politician—I shall call him Dave--who believes that his opponent’s victory would arouse moral chaos and utter detriment to society. If Dave knows that he cannot undermine his opponent in political debate, but that he can effectively ruin his opponent’s chances of winning the race by revealing embarrassing personal anecdotes—think Facebook pictures, sex-scandals, high school blunders—should he do this? Can he justify this war?

In war, the absolutist’s self-prescribed forbidden actions, like killing, or killing the innocent--or in the case of the politician: attacking something outside the bounds of relevance—seem to occasionally disallow the absolutist from choosing the lesser of two evils.

Nagel ultimately says that the world is an evil place, and that clear moral standards which allow us to definitively justify war are yet to be “codified.”

Happy Thanksgiving

John Rawls attempts to prove in his essay, "Classic Utilitarianism" that "[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons," (19). He does so by listing and explaining the appeals of utilitarianism only to then undermine utilitarianism using its own teleology. Classic utilitarianism, according to Rawls, assumes a society's structure is correct and so major institutions should try to allow the greatest amount of satisfaction throughout the society (14). We find utilitarian forms of justice appealing because it seems rational that a group should strive to advance their society's welfare as far as possible. If an individual tries to further his own good, should not a group of individuals attempt to further the group's good? But Rawls points out the flaws in that thinking. Utilitarianism simply requires a distribution of satisfaction throughout a society, not an achievement of satisfaction in all of a society's members. As Rawls points out, a strict utilitarian theory would attempt to combine the desires of all (or at least the majority of citizens) into one systematic desire. This leads to the belief that the greater satisfaction of some individuals would balance the losses of other individuals or, in theory, "the violation of the liberty of a few might... be made right by the greater good shared by many" (17). Essentially, as long as the society as a whole is satisfied, a smaller number of individuals (citizens) may suffer.

Reading Rawls' essay, a certain somewhat timely example came to my mind: healthcare. Many people agree with the telos of reforming healthcare in the United States. Nobody enjoys refusing individuals proper medical care. But a large and vocal group of Americans do not want to be forced to pay for others' medical bills. While they may be sympathetic to the suffering individuals, they do not want to have their own good minimized or less than maximized. People want to keep their money so that they may achieve their own satisfaction or good. So America is faced with a conflict of ideologies. Do we follow what Rawls claims is utilitarianism and ignore the sufferings of the minority so to better maximize the satisfaction, or good, of the larger society? Or do we follow a different theory of justice and try to satisfy every individual equally?

Food for Thought or the Straw That Stirs the Drink?

As suggested in the chapter’s title, Bernard Williams uses Consequentialism and Its Critics as a forum to discuss the notion of consequentialism and integrity. Essentially, consequentialism is the thought that moral judgment centers on the consequences of an action. According to Williams, a “distinctive mark of consequentialism might rather be this, that it regards the value of actions as always consequential … and not intrinsic” (21). It is his understanding that the only thing to have intrinsic value is states of affairs; however, the utilitarians feel that some actions must have intrinsic value as well (i.e. happiness). In response, Williams says that even though man might find an action to be pleasurable, it does not guarantee that these feelings will be attained every time because it may not be meant to be this way. Williams continues onward with his discourse by stating that the belief that the right action as that which maximizes the good is an “objective notion in this sense, that it is perfectly possible for an agent to be ignorant or mistaken, and non-culpably ignorant and mistaken about what is the right action in the circumstances” (23). If the agent consciously chooses the right alternative, the action will be right in virtue of its casual properties, particularly because it maximizes the good state of affairs (24).

Now that Williams provided the necessary framework for consequentialism, he introduces two scenarios dealing with negative responsibility, or the notion that “if I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I allow or fail to prevent” (31). In the first example, George is a man with a strong background in chemistry and is having great difficulty finding a job. One day, an older chemist approaches him and offers him with the opportunity to research chemical and biological warfare. George refuses to have his beliefs shaken and knows he must turn down this offer; instead, the job will likely go to a contemporary who has no qualms with CBW. In the second scenario, Jim is an explorer in South America who stumbles upon a group of twenty Indians held hostage by Pedro, a captain. Trapped, Jim was given the option by Pedro to kill one Indian and set the other nineteen free or, if he rejects this, all twenty will be murdered. After dreaming of pulling of a heroic deed, Jim finds himself facing reality and must make a decision. To the utilitarian and consequentialist, George should accept the job and Jim should kill the Indian. However, the big difference that Williams wants to address is what are the considerations that come into play when arriving at an answer, not simply the rightness of the answer (34-35).

Next, Williams begins his discussion on the two effects that are invoked by utilitarians. The first mentioned is the psychological effect on the agent. There is a chance that if Jim decides to kill this Indian, he will pay mentally. In doing so, “the effects on the will be in fact bad enough and extensive enough to cancel out the initial utilitarian advantages of that course” (36). The issue then becomes how much weight should feelings hold. Williams makes an argument that it should have no bearing, but the utilitarian would say that giving weight would serve as encouragement (37). The other effect Williams mentions is the precedent effect. This, as you can deduce, deals with the effects a precedent may establish for others. Williams points out that it is imperative to keep in mind whether the scenario is realistic and plausible. George’s quandary is not in a public situation that is sufficient and Jim’s predicament is extraordinarily extreme (41).

In his final section entitled “Integrity,” Williams seems to more or less recount what it is to be a utilitarian and the duties that ought to be carried out. For instance, he states that “he [utilitarian] has the general project of bringing about maximally desirable outcomes” (44). To Williams, it is critical to be involved in something else if happiness is to be attained. So, in order for a utilitarian to maximize happiness, he or she must not only continue on the pursuit of happiness, but also pursue other things. In doing so, the utilitarian might identify themselves with these outside objects and be happier than had those projects not existed (46-47).

I found this piece of literature to be both dense and rich with information. The two examples involving George and Jim were a nice way of slowing the pace and providing the reader with something tangible. Even though they were merely used to prove/clarify a point, I would have liked it more had he included a more realistic scenario (Williams, too, seems to admit that they are a bit far-fetched). Other than that, I actually do not know how I feel about this article. I seemed to have read it like a nonpartisan who was trying to understand the arguments posed by Bernard Williams. When I finished, I felt as if I had understood the majority of what he had written, but I cannot definitively say that I am buying/rejecting what he is selling. Instead, it seemed to provide food for thought more so than something that stirs the emotions. Comments? Reactions?

Utility & Justice For All

Mill begins this final chapter in “Utilitarianism” by pointing out one of the biggest problems people seem to have when discussing utilitarianism- the belief that it does not allow for the existence of justice. He sets out to prove that this is not true, and tries to explain the connection between justice and utility. He begins by attempting to find a common link in things that are considered just and unjust in order to better define justice, but with much difficulty. Mill decides to then take another route in his quest to define justice, and looks to the words origins. He explains that justice has always been used in terms of the law. Even today we like to describe even the smallest of events - events we would not even think to involve a court of law in - as just or unjust. 

This makes sense though, Mill explains. “The idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong doing”. We only consider something wrong when we consider it punishable, whether that is by law or simply by our own opinions. With this in mind, MIll introduces the idea of perfect and imperfect obligations. A perfect obligation is a duty of virtue that a person has a right to have and can demand of each other, while imperfect obligations are duties of virtue that aren’t required , such as charity. Understanding this concept of perfect obligation makes defining justice much easier. When a person’s perfect obligations are imposed upon by another, injustice is occurring, and in this case it is moral for the one at fault to be penalized in some way. 

Finally. So now that we know what justice is, how is it related to utility? Mill states that there are two parts of justice, which are the want to punish the person who is wrong, and the knowledge that the wronged person has had their rights taken away. The desire for punishment springs from our natural urge to defend ourselves, but our defense is instead for society itself. The fact that a person has had their rights taken away, and that society must do something to defend this right, is once again a utilitarian mindset. We seek to protect our rights because we know that if we do not, we are not keeping our society safe. Security is necessary in society in order for happiness to exist. 

Not only does Mill think that there is a place in utilitarian thought for justice, but also that laws which include both justice and utility are the most important laws, and are vital to morality. Laws that prevent murder are much more important than laws about management, for example. Justice and utility seem to work together. Mill states that people are obligated to act justly as it exists high upon the “scale of social utility”. However, if a case arises where one of these rules must be broken in order to satisfy something higher on the scale of utility, this is understandable and moral. He states for example, that if it is necessary to steal in order to save a life, stealing would not be considered unjust.

I guess I can agree with pretty much all of the arguments Mill makes, but I don’t know how comfortable this agreement makes me. I still get the feeling that the good of society is coming before my own, which is a little difficult for me to accept. That being said, I suppose it’s a lot easier to swallow than the chaos that is Kant’s philosophy on ethics, and so utilitarianism seems like a big sigh of relief. 

Ultimate Sanction Battle!

In this chapter, Mill says he will explore what built-in sanctions utilitarianism can provide; in other words, what punishments the philosophy might impose upon those who do not abide by it. There are External and Internal Sanctions. Internal Sanctions of duty, can be summed up as your conscious, it is a feeling in our own mind which lets us know whether or not what we are doing is ethically moral or not. External sanctions exist externally to the human agent as an individual; they may take the form of peer pressure, the fear of their disapproval, or of divine pressure, the fear of his wrath. Mill argues that these motives could just as easily be associated with utilitarianism as with any other moral system.

It would seem now, that internal sanctions would be the most powerful in influencing the moral decisions. It is one thing to have peer pressure put upon you. But when it is your own conscious it would seem that internal sanctions may be the ultimate sanction. This statement is correct, because our conscious influences our moral actions and decisions. Thus, if internal sanctions provide the strongest influence over people's actions, utilitarianism must appeal to people's inner sentiments in order to exercise a binding force on them.

Mill then goes on to say that moral feelings must be acquired and that society is moving towards a feeling of unity. Mill then goes on to say that society can teach these feelings of unity through education and law. He asserts that if we imagine that this feeling of social unity were taught in the same way religion is taught, and thus implanted as an internal sanction, then utilitarianism would exercise a binding force sufficient to influence behavior. Basically, Mill is stating that if we are taught moral behaviors from the time when we are little, society over time would grow to became a complete moral society.

Insert Pun Here

Mill begins this chapter by saying that the principles of Utilitarianism cannot be proven by reason. Thus, we must explore the reasons for the validity of Utilitarianism. However, the only proof that can be given for the validity is that we consider happiness to be desirable.

To prove that happiness is desirable is rather simple. When we want to prove an object is visible, we see it and show that it can be seen. Therefore to prove that happiness is desirable, we desire it and show that it is desired as the main end of life.

However, some do argue that although the desire for things such as happiness is universal, desire for things such as virtue and absence of vice is not universal and therefore a secondary end to human life besides happiness. Mill argues that this is false. If virtue is desired, it is because virtue is a necessary part of happiness, rather than a separate goal.

This leads to the further conclusion that anything that is desired as anything other than a means to happiness, for example how virtue is desired for its own sake is desired because happiness is a definite thing with component parts. And the desire for said part once again leads back to the idea that happiness is the sole desire of human existence.

Mill strongly believes these ideas and then goes on refute the only possible counterpoint to this issue: the moral will. Opponents to utilitarianism argue that moral will is something that exists outside of physical or emotional desire. Virtuous people do moral good without expecting or desiring any physical or emotional returns on their “investments.” While Mill does admit that will is different from desire and can become an end in of itself, will almost always originates in desire. Because at one point said person has associated doing good acts with happiness, simply willing it now even though it is no longer from desire, does not change that the original act is done from happiness, therefore making happiness the ultimate goal of life itself.

So in conclusion, utilitarianism is proven to be the most valid philosophy because as we can see, happiness is the only desire of life. Anything we desire that isn’t happiness or a means to get to happiness is instead a component of happiness. And although we may begin to will things instead of doing them from happiness, we still at one point did them to achieve happiness and continue to do so out of habit.

These ideas are really striking to me. When reading Mill I find myself agreeing that most if not all of the things I do and the decisions I make involve to some extent a reflection on how the decision would affect me. I also began to think of the little “good” things we do on a daily basis, like saying “bless you” or holding a door open for someone walking by. While I do perform these actions from will, rather than any desire, I can’t help but think that at some point I only learned these actions because I was taught to consider these actions to be worthy of praise and that I would be happy if I were to be praised.

Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001.