Being Good, But With Limits?

In the terms of Sen, I am at a great risk of over-simplifying. This Sen's essay involves much more than my blog represents. Letting everyone know.

“Rights and Agency” is an evaluation done by Amartya Sen on two different moral systems: welfarist consequentialism and constraint-based deontology. He discusses the inadequacies of each of these moral systems and speaks of an alternative approach, the goal rights system. Through this system, our morality is evaluated through agencies that view an action from different perspectives, and our freedoms, both positive and negative, are based on the final analysis of our moral decision.

Welfarist consequentialism is simply based on the social judgments of right or wrong through the consideration of consequences, more specifically, consequences of people’s welfare. All welfarist actions were for the benefit, whether in pleasure, happiness, or desires, of the majority (p 191). Constraint-based deontology determines morality by actions, and not the intentions and consequences that come from that action (p 189). There is no external or internal judgment. It simply is what it is. Sen believes there is too great of a separation of these two moral systems and a moral decision cannot be fully met, as in his example of Ali, the shopkeeper, and his friend Donna, who tries to save him from a bashing (p 191-193). From the welfarist consequentialist point of view, the consequences are more detrimental to the rest of the population for Donna to act to save Ali. From the constrained-based point of view, the act of breaking into someone’s private home is viewed as wrong and immoral. In the end, Donna cannot save Ali morally, regardless of what she does. Because these two moral systems do not create a moral end, so to speak, for Ali cannot be saved form the bashing, Sen’s alternative approach is a goal rights system.

A goal rights system recognizes different characteristics and contexts of a situation so an individual may decide to, and should, act morally. Different states of affairs are looked at by different criteria and the most moral action, in regards to action or inaction (positive and negative freedoms), can be decided on. If Ali was not getting bashed, but only his business was threatened, Donna would have no legitimate moral reason to break other rules, like breaking into Charles’s apartment (p 202). The criteria are based on the perspectives and interpretations of agencies, doers and viewers, with one of a few guidelines in mind: do only if you would let another person the same (p 205).

Why is it that our moral systems have such strict guidelines on what is moral? Without room for interpretation, very few of our actions can be completely moral and beneficiary to all. We must look at the context of the state of affairs, view it from all perspectives, personally and objectively, and decide if the action the situation entails is moral. Sen is right to say that “…considerations to any role [should be made] in outcome judgments” (p 221) and that we have the rights to decide on these considerations. The goal rights system is the acknowledgement of the possibilities of the different orientation of good and wrong.

Justice: Killing Old People & Revealing Sex-Scandals?

In “War and Massacre,” Thomas Nagel examines our ability to justify actions, both on a personal and a national level, through the lenses of absolutism (which focuses on actions), and utilitarianism (which focuses on ends). As an avid news reader and watcher, I could not help but relate Nagel's work to our world's current events. Over the course of the past five years, I have read the news every morning, and watched it in the evening with some consistent frequency. While the names and faces may change with each new day, there remain two unwavering story categories: war and politics.

First, let us discuss war: In an age of increased tension between our country and what seems like the rest of the world, war has been pushed to the forefront of global events. When I read the word “war,” I am, of course, reminded of Iraq--a war justified by some and reprimanded by others. Next, I think of Afghanistan, and our perpetual “war on terror”—8 years after the September 11 tragedy, several worldwide terrorist attacks later, and, as of today, 30,000 more troops committed to the cause—will we ever actually attain desirable results? If the cause is worth pursuing, how should we proceed? Naturally, the controversy and justification of torture is implied when discussing our fight against terror. Can we justify our actions of war and torture without taking accountability for their indirect outcomes (absolutism); or should we focus on creating the greatest outcomes possible, without overt regard to our actions (utilitarianism)?

Nagel presents us with a conundrum to help contextualize the struggle: is it justifiable to bomb an area, thus killing innocent civilians—namely “women, babies and old people”—if we are in fact killing a leading combatant? What if we don’t kill our target, but the civilian causalities cause enemy surrender? For an absolutist, the action of killing is one that ought never to be done; but can killing be justified if it, in turn, creates a greater good? Conversely, can the act of not killing be justified if it in turn causes greater harm? It is clear that the type of person we kill in war becomes increasingly important. There seems to be an unwritten standard of “foul play”—and killing innocent people violates that code.

Next, Nagel provides an example of a politician—I shall call him Dave--who believes that his opponent’s victory would arouse moral chaos and utter detriment to society. If Dave knows that he cannot undermine his opponent in political debate, but that he can effectively ruin his opponent’s chances of winning the race by revealing embarrassing personal anecdotes—think Facebook pictures, sex-scandals, high school blunders—should he do this? Can he justify this war?

In war, the absolutist’s self-prescribed forbidden actions, like killing, or killing the innocent--or in the case of the politician: attacking something outside the bounds of relevance—seem to occasionally disallow the absolutist from choosing the lesser of two evils.

Nagel ultimately says that the world is an evil place, and that clear moral standards which allow us to definitively justify war are yet to be “codified.”

Happy Thanksgiving

John Rawls attempts to prove in his essay, "Classic Utilitarianism" that "[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons," (19). He does so by listing and explaining the appeals of utilitarianism only to then undermine utilitarianism using its own teleology. Classic utilitarianism, according to Rawls, assumes a society's structure is correct and so major institutions should try to allow the greatest amount of satisfaction throughout the society (14). We find utilitarian forms of justice appealing because it seems rational that a group should strive to advance their society's welfare as far as possible. If an individual tries to further his own good, should not a group of individuals attempt to further the group's good? But Rawls points out the flaws in that thinking. Utilitarianism simply requires a distribution of satisfaction throughout a society, not an achievement of satisfaction in all of a society's members. As Rawls points out, a strict utilitarian theory would attempt to combine the desires of all (or at least the majority of citizens) into one systematic desire. This leads to the belief that the greater satisfaction of some individuals would balance the losses of other individuals or, in theory, "the violation of the liberty of a few might... be made right by the greater good shared by many" (17). Essentially, as long as the society as a whole is satisfied, a smaller number of individuals (citizens) may suffer.

Reading Rawls' essay, a certain somewhat timely example came to my mind: healthcare. Many people agree with the telos of reforming healthcare in the United States. Nobody enjoys refusing individuals proper medical care. But a large and vocal group of Americans do not want to be forced to pay for others' medical bills. While they may be sympathetic to the suffering individuals, they do not want to have their own good minimized or less than maximized. People want to keep their money so that they may achieve their own satisfaction or good. So America is faced with a conflict of ideologies. Do we follow what Rawls claims is utilitarianism and ignore the sufferings of the minority so to better maximize the satisfaction, or good, of the larger society? Or do we follow a different theory of justice and try to satisfy every individual equally?

Food for Thought or the Straw That Stirs the Drink?

As suggested in the chapter’s title, Bernard Williams uses Consequentialism and Its Critics as a forum to discuss the notion of consequentialism and integrity. Essentially, consequentialism is the thought that moral judgment centers on the consequences of an action. According to Williams, a “distinctive mark of consequentialism might rather be this, that it regards the value of actions as always consequential … and not intrinsic” (21). It is his understanding that the only thing to have intrinsic value is states of affairs; however, the utilitarians feel that some actions must have intrinsic value as well (i.e. happiness). In response, Williams says that even though man might find an action to be pleasurable, it does not guarantee that these feelings will be attained every time because it may not be meant to be this way. Williams continues onward with his discourse by stating that the belief that the right action as that which maximizes the good is an “objective notion in this sense, that it is perfectly possible for an agent to be ignorant or mistaken, and non-culpably ignorant and mistaken about what is the right action in the circumstances” (23). If the agent consciously chooses the right alternative, the action will be right in virtue of its casual properties, particularly because it maximizes the good state of affairs (24).

Now that Williams provided the necessary framework for consequentialism, he introduces two scenarios dealing with negative responsibility, or the notion that “if I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I allow or fail to prevent” (31). In the first example, George is a man with a strong background in chemistry and is having great difficulty finding a job. One day, an older chemist approaches him and offers him with the opportunity to research chemical and biological warfare. George refuses to have his beliefs shaken and knows he must turn down this offer; instead, the job will likely go to a contemporary who has no qualms with CBW. In the second scenario, Jim is an explorer in South America who stumbles upon a group of twenty Indians held hostage by Pedro, a captain. Trapped, Jim was given the option by Pedro to kill one Indian and set the other nineteen free or, if he rejects this, all twenty will be murdered. After dreaming of pulling of a heroic deed, Jim finds himself facing reality and must make a decision. To the utilitarian and consequentialist, George should accept the job and Jim should kill the Indian. However, the big difference that Williams wants to address is what are the considerations that come into play when arriving at an answer, not simply the rightness of the answer (34-35).

Next, Williams begins his discussion on the two effects that are invoked by utilitarians. The first mentioned is the psychological effect on the agent. There is a chance that if Jim decides to kill this Indian, he will pay mentally. In doing so, “the effects on the will be in fact bad enough and extensive enough to cancel out the initial utilitarian advantages of that course” (36). The issue then becomes how much weight should feelings hold. Williams makes an argument that it should have no bearing, but the utilitarian would say that giving weight would serve as encouragement (37). The other effect Williams mentions is the precedent effect. This, as you can deduce, deals with the effects a precedent may establish for others. Williams points out that it is imperative to keep in mind whether the scenario is realistic and plausible. George’s quandary is not in a public situation that is sufficient and Jim’s predicament is extraordinarily extreme (41).

In his final section entitled “Integrity,” Williams seems to more or less recount what it is to be a utilitarian and the duties that ought to be carried out. For instance, he states that “he [utilitarian] has the general project of bringing about maximally desirable outcomes” (44). To Williams, it is critical to be involved in something else if happiness is to be attained. So, in order for a utilitarian to maximize happiness, he or she must not only continue on the pursuit of happiness, but also pursue other things. In doing so, the utilitarian might identify themselves with these outside objects and be happier than had those projects not existed (46-47).

I found this piece of literature to be both dense and rich with information. The two examples involving George and Jim were a nice way of slowing the pace and providing the reader with something tangible. Even though they were merely used to prove/clarify a point, I would have liked it more had he included a more realistic scenario (Williams, too, seems to admit that they are a bit far-fetched). Other than that, I actually do not know how I feel about this article. I seemed to have read it like a nonpartisan who was trying to understand the arguments posed by Bernard Williams. When I finished, I felt as if I had understood the majority of what he had written, but I cannot definitively say that I am buying/rejecting what he is selling. Instead, it seemed to provide food for thought more so than something that stirs the emotions. Comments? Reactions?

Utility & Justice For All

Mill begins this final chapter in “Utilitarianism” by pointing out one of the biggest problems people seem to have when discussing utilitarianism- the belief that it does not allow for the existence of justice. He sets out to prove that this is not true, and tries to explain the connection between justice and utility. He begins by attempting to find a common link in things that are considered just and unjust in order to better define justice, but with much difficulty. Mill decides to then take another route in his quest to define justice, and looks to the words origins. He explains that justice has always been used in terms of the law. Even today we like to describe even the smallest of events - events we would not even think to involve a court of law in - as just or unjust. 

This makes sense though, Mill explains. “The idea of penal sanction, which is the essence of law, enters not only into the conception of injustice, but into that of any kind of wrong doing”. We only consider something wrong when we consider it punishable, whether that is by law or simply by our own opinions. With this in mind, MIll introduces the idea of perfect and imperfect obligations. A perfect obligation is a duty of virtue that a person has a right to have and can demand of each other, while imperfect obligations are duties of virtue that aren’t required , such as charity. Understanding this concept of perfect obligation makes defining justice much easier. When a person’s perfect obligations are imposed upon by another, injustice is occurring, and in this case it is moral for the one at fault to be penalized in some way. 

Finally. So now that we know what justice is, how is it related to utility? Mill states that there are two parts of justice, which are the want to punish the person who is wrong, and the knowledge that the wronged person has had their rights taken away. The desire for punishment springs from our natural urge to defend ourselves, but our defense is instead for society itself. The fact that a person has had their rights taken away, and that society must do something to defend this right, is once again a utilitarian mindset. We seek to protect our rights because we know that if we do not, we are not keeping our society safe. Security is necessary in society in order for happiness to exist. 

Not only does Mill think that there is a place in utilitarian thought for justice, but also that laws which include both justice and utility are the most important laws, and are vital to morality. Laws that prevent murder are much more important than laws about management, for example. Justice and utility seem to work together. Mill states that people are obligated to act justly as it exists high upon the “scale of social utility”. However, if a case arises where one of these rules must be broken in order to satisfy something higher on the scale of utility, this is understandable and moral. He states for example, that if it is necessary to steal in order to save a life, stealing would not be considered unjust.

I guess I can agree with pretty much all of the arguments Mill makes, but I don’t know how comfortable this agreement makes me. I still get the feeling that the good of society is coming before my own, which is a little difficult for me to accept. That being said, I suppose it’s a lot easier to swallow than the chaos that is Kant’s philosophy on ethics, and so utilitarianism seems like a big sigh of relief. 

Ultimate Sanction Battle!

In this chapter, Mill says he will explore what built-in sanctions utilitarianism can provide; in other words, what punishments the philosophy might impose upon those who do not abide by it. There are External and Internal Sanctions. Internal Sanctions of duty, can be summed up as your conscious, it is a feeling in our own mind which lets us know whether or not what we are doing is ethically moral or not. External sanctions exist externally to the human agent as an individual; they may take the form of peer pressure, the fear of their disapproval, or of divine pressure, the fear of his wrath. Mill argues that these motives could just as easily be associated with utilitarianism as with any other moral system.

It would seem now, that internal sanctions would be the most powerful in influencing the moral decisions. It is one thing to have peer pressure put upon you. But when it is your own conscious it would seem that internal sanctions may be the ultimate sanction. This statement is correct, because our conscious influences our moral actions and decisions. Thus, if internal sanctions provide the strongest influence over people's actions, utilitarianism must appeal to people's inner sentiments in order to exercise a binding force on them.

Mill then goes on to say that moral feelings must be acquired and that society is moving towards a feeling of unity. Mill then goes on to say that society can teach these feelings of unity through education and law. He asserts that if we imagine that this feeling of social unity were taught in the same way religion is taught, and thus implanted as an internal sanction, then utilitarianism would exercise a binding force sufficient to influence behavior. Basically, Mill is stating that if we are taught moral behaviors from the time when we are little, society over time would grow to became a complete moral society.

Insert Pun Here

Mill begins this chapter by saying that the principles of Utilitarianism cannot be proven by reason. Thus, we must explore the reasons for the validity of Utilitarianism. However, the only proof that can be given for the validity is that we consider happiness to be desirable.

To prove that happiness is desirable is rather simple. When we want to prove an object is visible, we see it and show that it can be seen. Therefore to prove that happiness is desirable, we desire it and show that it is desired as the main end of life.

However, some do argue that although the desire for things such as happiness is universal, desire for things such as virtue and absence of vice is not universal and therefore a secondary end to human life besides happiness. Mill argues that this is false. If virtue is desired, it is because virtue is a necessary part of happiness, rather than a separate goal.

This leads to the further conclusion that anything that is desired as anything other than a means to happiness, for example how virtue is desired for its own sake is desired because happiness is a definite thing with component parts. And the desire for said part once again leads back to the idea that happiness is the sole desire of human existence.

Mill strongly believes these ideas and then goes on refute the only possible counterpoint to this issue: the moral will. Opponents to utilitarianism argue that moral will is something that exists outside of physical or emotional desire. Virtuous people do moral good without expecting or desiring any physical or emotional returns on their “investments.” While Mill does admit that will is different from desire and can become an end in of itself, will almost always originates in desire. Because at one point said person has associated doing good acts with happiness, simply willing it now even though it is no longer from desire, does not change that the original act is done from happiness, therefore making happiness the ultimate goal of life itself.

So in conclusion, utilitarianism is proven to be the most valid philosophy because as we can see, happiness is the only desire of life. Anything we desire that isn’t happiness or a means to get to happiness is instead a component of happiness. And although we may begin to will things instead of doing them from happiness, we still at one point did them to achieve happiness and continue to do so out of habit.

These ideas are really striking to me. When reading Mill I find myself agreeing that most if not all of the things I do and the decisions I make involve to some extent a reflection on how the decision would affect me. I also began to think of the little “good” things we do on a daily basis, like saying “bless you” or holding a door open for someone walking by. While I do perform these actions from will, rather than any desire, I can’t help but think that at some point I only learned these actions because I was taught to consider these actions to be worthy of praise and that I would be happy if I were to be praised.

Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001.

A First Look at Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism has had its misunderstandings, those of which John Stuart Mill is trying to erase from the public in his book, surprisingly called, "Utilitarianism." Within his first two chapters, we are introduced to what utilitarianism is, and he starts with stating that "all action is for the sake of some end." How then do we decide if our action is right or wrong? He states that some claim we have a moral instinct telling us what is right or wrong, but firstly, we must have a standard to which our actions should be judged (sounds familiar). Therefore, Mill states that there must be "one fundamental principle or law at the root of all morality" because since our moral beliefs have changed little over time, there exists one standard, the standard of utility or the "greatest happiness principle." This is just the beginning of Mill's to come explanation and argument for utilitarianism.

To clear things up, Mill makes it clear that utilitarianism is not in opposition of pleasure, but in fact it is "pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain" and thus where the greatest happiness principle comes in and claims that "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." Meaning, happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain and unhappiness is the deprivation of pleasure. This is important because Mill states that the only things desirable in the end, the only things inherently good are pleasure and the absence of pain. Utiliarianism also brings into account not only the quality of the end, but the quantity as well, which is why one of noble character, although the individual may not be exceedingly happy, it is a benefit for the community. Also, in regards to quality and quantity, certain pleasures, according to Mill, can be more valuable than others based on experiences. If people choose one pleasure over another even if that pleasure is accompanied by discomfort, then that first pleasure is more valuable than the second.

Happiness is also considered a sign of using our "higher facilities" (the ability to use logic whereas animals cannot) because people who have access to all pleasures will prefer the pleasure that appeal to their higher facilities. As Mill states it so eloquently, "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig dissatisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question."

What struck me most about Mill was how he can claim certain pleasures are more valuable than others. It seems as though he is degraded other pleasures that cannot amount to the others. Yes, reading a book like "Great Expectations" would be mentally stimulating and pleasurable, but is it fair to compare that to eating a perfectly chocolately chocolate cake? Mill states that only those with broad experiences can say which is a higher quality, but then this goes against the idea of comparing things to one standard because instead, its a variety of different people with different ranges of experience. But also, what makes a pleasure more valuable than another? There was never a set comparison point, like its more educational, or more sensual?

Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001.

Kant we stop this? Please.

Immanuel Kant- the bane of existence for any philosophy student "encouraged" to read his writings.

"Kantian Ethics" by Onora O'Neill is a highly condensed version of Immanuel's ethical code, "which is marked by an unswerving commitment to human freedom, to the dignity of man, and to the view that moral obligation derives neither from God, nor from human authorities and communities, nor from the preferences or desires of human agents, but from reason"(O'Neill 175). O'Neill goes on to state the obvious, that "his [Kant's] writings are difficult and systematic" (175) but she divulges a method to keep Kant's audience sane. O'Neill says that to understand Kant, it is important to keep three concepts distinct from one another: (1)Kant's ethics, (2)"Kant's ethics", and (3)Kantian ethics.

So much clearer.

(1)Kant's ethics are contained in his writings of the 1780s and 1790s, which includes "Ground work of the Metaphysics of Morals." It is in this work that Kant introduces his idea of maxims, or fundamental principles of action, that we ought to adopt. The "Categorical imperative" aims at a universal moral code, which would be ideal. It is from a respect for others that Kant strives to establish a Categorical imperative. Since all humans have the capacity for reason, then we must treat all humans equally. To treat everyone equally, we must first set up principles on how to act in every situation. Thus, we have the Categorical imperative, in five formulations.

(2)"Kant's ethics" are ideas that show up so often in Kant's writing that they have "acquired an idependent life as elements of Kant's ethics." "Kant's ethics" have been the subject of numerous criticisms, most of which having to do with Kantian ideas that conflict with each other, ideas that are empty and shapeless, and ideas that are too strict to apply in every situation.

(3)Kantian ethics is an umbrella term used to refer to anything that is of "quasi-Kantian positions or commitments in ethics." So, essentially, Kant's ethics+"Kant's ethics"+ anything of quasi-Kantian concern= Kantian ethics. Not so bad, is it? For example, John Rawls, who features many of Kant's views in his own work falls under the broad term of Kantian ethics.

If your brain is fried, don't be alarmed. Old Ima tends to have that effect on people.

ROBOTS ARE TAKING OVER THE WORLD!

Okay, so robots are not taking over the world. But imagine if you were controlled like a robot. Your programmer would control every decision you make. So would you be free? According to Kant, you can be free in a situation like this as long as you believe that your actions are performed freely. For Kant, as you make decisions from self-adopted principles, you must consider yourself as having free will (163).

In “Morality as freedom,” Korsgaard attempts to clarify Kantian ethical philosophy about the conception of freedom in morality. She first presents why Kant believes that moral law is the law of a free will. Their relationship depends on the idea that we are free only insofar as we act morally. Freedom is only significant if you act in accordance with moral law. But this freedom does not explain our interest or motivation toward morality.

Korsgaard explains that we are motivated to morality because our “intelligible existence” gives us “higher vocation” to make the world a rational place. Having the thought of that “higher vocation is the motive of morality” (171).

Together, freedom and our existence in the intelligible world give us a conception of how to follow the moral law (174). There are six things we must do and acknowledge: 1) Approach morality and act as if we are (negatively) free – nothing external can influence your actions. 2) Act on maxims freely chosen. 3) Eliminate inclinations to find the moral law (the positive conception of freedom) and act on it. 4) As we act on the moral law, we are free. 5) Negative freedom teaches that we are part of the intelligible world; therefore, we have a higher vocation to achieve the Highest Good. 6) Intelligible freedom gives us the incentive to be positively free or moral (175).

Korsgaard now asks the question, if interest in the Highest Good determines our moral actions, how can we be free? We must examine Kant’s theory of virtue or “internal freedom” (176). Humans act for the sake of an end. For Kant, to make these ends moral, we must direct them towards humanity and other aims that could be derived from it (177). For human beings, freedom takes the form of a virtue – the adoption and pursuit of moral ends (178). We cultivate virtues when we respect humanity and overcome our inclinations.

So freedom is both the incentive to act morally and the product of acting morally. We freely fulfill a higher vocation, which moves us to moral conduct. In other words, the conception of freedom motivates us to act virtuously and these virtuous actions make us free.

I found clarity in Korsgaard’s paper. She helped me make sense of Kant’s view of morality but there was one thing that confused me. She says that “a positive conception of freedom would be a material account of what such a will would in fact choose” (162). She then says that in Kant’s view is that moral law is the positive conception of freedom. If the positive conception of freedom is material then isn’t it a desire and therefore cannot be moral? Is she saying Kant’s definition is different? Or is it that a “material account” is an end and for Kant, moral ends are the only ends we should seek; therefore, justifying that the moral law is the positive conception of freedom?

Doing Duty from Duty

An end is an object of free choice and the representation of which determines it to an action. If an end is based off of free choice, is it safe to say that there are ends that are also duties? According to Kant there are two instances in which ends are duties: one’s own perfection and the happiness of others. In achieving one’s own perfection a human being has a duty to lessen his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors, morally practical reason commands it absolutely and makes this end his duty, so that he may be worthy for society.

The greatest perfection of a human being is to do his duty from duty (for the law to be not only the rule but also the incentive of his actions). When it comes to promoting the happiness of other human beings as an end that is also a duty, one has to make their end your end as well. It is for them to decide what they count as belonging to their happiness, but it is open to you to refuse them any things that according to them will make them happy but that you know it will not.

Why in the world would we want the happiness of others? There is a principle of ethical reward, that rewards those that in accordance with the laws of virtue for promoting what all human beings recognize as their natural end(for making their happiness his own), and that reward is mainly a moral pleasure that goes beyond mere contentment with oneself. If promoting the true well-being of others even when they fail to recognize it (when they are ungrateful) it usually yields no such return but all that it produces is contentment with oneself.

The main principle of the doctrine of virtue is to act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have. In accordance with this principle a human being is an end for himself as well as for others; it is in his duty to make the human being his end. This theme goes back to the formula of end itself.

Is this Right?

A couple weeks ago there was a story posted on CNN.com about a 15-year old girl, from California, who was gang raped outside of a homecoming dance. Surrounding this horrendous event was a group of around twenty people, who either participated in it or just stood around, watching and taking pictures with their phones. Now a situation like this makes me wonder about who was right and who was wrong. The people performing the rape seem to be guilty and wrong for their deed. This is not only based off of local, state, and federal laws, but off of universal maxims that society has created for itself. It guides our behavior and tells us that it is immoral and wrong to harm others.
These gang rapists were wrong, because they took away that girl’s freedom and made her do something against her will. To Kant, a right deals with the association or relation of people, with an influence by the law of freedom. Freedom is what is right, only in the way in which it cannot hinder anyone else’s freedom. This would mean that in the case of the girl at homecoming, the gang rapists’ wrong actions hindered her from the freedom to choose the right actions for her self-preservation.
One of the most intriguing subsections of the Doctrine of Right is that of coercion. Coercion, alone, is seen as a hindrance on freedom and is, thus, a wrong action. Though this is true, Kant states that coercion can be used to control those people who have a tendency to will the wrong with a fear of the consequences (SEP). This idea goes back to the two incentives to do right; one being ethically by duty and the other being judicially by a person’s will. This will can be persuaded by fear and inclination. In the incident described before, it was mentioned that there was a crowd around them, watching the event unfold, doing nothing to stop it. This idea of the bystander leads one to think about this idea of coercion. Is there a law that talks about the role of the bystander in this type of situation? Is it the bystander’s duty to do something when they know this act is limiting someone’s freedom? Perhaps they were coerced into maintaining a non-responsive mindset. In the mind of the bystander, everyone else around them was doing the same thing as them, so it must be right. Kant would say that this idea goes against the universal laws and is, thus, wrong. He states in “What is Right?”, “ but whether what these laws prescribed is also right, and what the universal criterion is by which one could recognize right as well as wrong" (Kant 6:230). Instead of regarding the “laws prescribed” as governmental laws, we can apply the same theory to social laws, like that of the bystander. This social law is a coercion of individuals to follow the masses’ behavior.
Kant would then say that the way to rid of this coercion is to have a coercion on coercion, or, in other words, “...hindering of a hindrance to freedom...” (6:229). Thus, we gain specific governmental laws to coerce those who will with wrong inclination to follow universal laws. We then gain a solid approach to what is right, making sure that everyone follows the universal laws (though easier said then done).

References:
Chen, Stephanie. "Gang rape raises questions about bystanders' role." CNN Justice. 30 Oct. 2009. Web. 30 Oct. 2009. .
Anderson, Scott. "Coercion." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 10 Feb. 2006. Web. 9 Nov. 2009. .
Immanuel, Kant,. Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print.

Moral action? I Kant tell

So it’s getting close to that time of the year. I know Halloween hasn’t even happened yet but pretty soon we’ll begin to hear those bells on street corners synonymous with the holiday season. We all know how it goes, you walk by, slip a dollar into the bucket and walk away feeling that you have done something good. In all fairness, yes, such an action is a decent gesture. One would agree that it is people’s moral duty to help others, less fortunate people. Unfortunately, Kant would say that there may be other motives behind such actions and just participating in them isn’t necessarily being moral. “…it is always doubtful whether it [the action] is really done from duty and therefore has moral worth.” (Kant 406) Well that sure takes the wind out of our morality sails. What Kant is saying is that behind every action, there is a way to find an ulterior motive. If an action is performed by obligation of duty, and not through duty alone, then it is not truly a moral activity. Kant even goes on to say that it is impossible to find a single action that can be attributed to purely duty. So how are we supposed to act morally if everything we do can be attributed to something else? There must be some set of rules or laws which can determine if our actions are moral… nope. Kant states that we cannot derive some code of morality based on our experiences. Each circumstance is different and requires a reading that one universal set of morals would not be able to explain. Also, we cannot find morality through looking at examples. This is because morality is priori in nature. Therefore we are unable to fit different experiences into the concept of morality for all circumstances are different (in terms of action, motive) and would need to be assessed as such.

Well I don’t know about you but I can’t help but feel discouraged. Not only does Kant say that most actions are just through the obligation of duty and not through duty alone, but he also says that it is impossible to find any action that is done through duty alone. There is a brighter side to this seemingly bleak look on morality. Through a better understanding of the priori nature of morality, one can progress morally and gain a better sense of morality. Imperatives are the formula or reason’s demands. These objective principles give us a better sense of morality (413). If one understands that these imperatives are a priori, one can act in a matter that they would want to be seen as a universal law. For example, help others in need because that is what you feel should be the preexisting universal law. So next time you hear that bell ringing as you walk through time square, don’t feel disheartened and refrain from slipping in a dollar or two.

You Kant Do That on Television

Kant begins this section by describing how in order for us to morally judge our actions, we must will our maxims into universal laws in order to ground them as those in pure reason. However, when it is the case that we do actions that inherently contradictory, we are not willing our maxims into false universal laws (which according to Kant is impossible) or even believing the opposites of our maxims to be true. Instead, our inclinations force us to view the categorical imperative twice, once with pure will and again with a will tainted by our inclinations. This allows us to transform the universal law into generality. In turn, we use this generality to make exceptions for ourselves (but just this one time, I swear.) and perform the contradictory action.
This can be seen when one considers those who refer to themselves as “social smokers.” When they do not smoke on their own, they are following what appears to be a universal law of not smoking. However when placed in a social situation where others are smoking, their inclination towards smoking allows them to say “I’m at a party/bar/whatever; it’s ok to make this exception.”
This is also one of Kant’s ways of proving the necessity of a priori principles. Because we view our actions with the taint of inclination afterwards, we must use a priori ideas to judge our actions because that can be done without inclination regardless of whether the action actually happens.
Kant also goes on to speak about how in our actions, we must never treat people as purely a means. We instead must regard each rational creature involved as an end in of themselves. This is done by having any other rational party be completely in agreement and in understanding of what they are doing, how they are helping you, and what your goal is. Thus it becomes duty to keep up your fair share of the bargain whatever it may be.
Thus when borrowing money, if you attempt to do so without any intent to return said money and lie to the person you are attempting to borrow money from, you are in error, for this is treating someone as simply a means. But if you borrow money with full intent to repay and make it clear that you will, you are respecting the will of the other rational being involved and therefore treating them as an end in of themselves and not just a mean.

Transition from...

Immanuel Kant states that there is nothing good in excess except a good will. This is said mainly because unlike some virtues, such as courage or perseverance, a good will cannot be used in accordance to evil. A good will is not considered good due to the actions a person takes, it is intrinsically good and is more desirable than any action which comes from it, or the total sum of the actions which have come about because of it.

Having given a decent explanation of what a good will is, Kant sees that there may be an issue with nature by assigning reason to be the commander of will. Nature gives every complex creature a specific end- happiness. Apart from giving us a specific end, nature also provides a means for us to attain happiness, which is called instinct. Although instinct provides a general means of attaining happiness, rational thought impedes this process by creating more trouble rather than simplifying the path to happiness.

This brings Kant to describe the idea of a will that is to be revered in itself, without considering the actions which came about because of it. This brings about the concept of duty which contains a limited good will, which causes the true good will to be seen more radiantly by contrast. An example given, is that of a shopkeeper. As a shopkeeper, prices for goods sold within the shop remain constant for whoever wishes to purchase them. The level of prices, which are constant for everyone, are done for his advantage and not because it was his duty to do so. The moral worth of an action does not lie in its expected effect

Kant then defines duty as: "the duty of an action from respect for law". And follows by describing the defining the law as: "I ought to never act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law". All of a persons actions should be in accord with the universal law. With this figurative moral compass a person can easily tell what is a good inclination and what is a bad inclination, and would only perform the behavior which is good.

This would then however, give rise to the tendency to rationalize against strict laws and cast a shadow of doubt on their necessity. By being doubtful, people will begin to make the laws better suited to their own wishes, which begins to corrupt the laws themselves. This then pushes common human reason into the field of philosophy.

What have you learned from your colleagues?

I am curious about how inter-student learning works, and like Socrates, I proclaim my ignorance in this matter. In particular, I am interested in it because I want this blog to function as a space where students can develop the concepts that they encounter in the readings or lectures.

I would like to know what things you have learned, philosophically, from your fellow students and how it happened. It could pertain to this class or another. I assume one place that inter-student learning takes place is during study sessions for exams.

Please feel free to be candid.

Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Wait … What?!

    Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals is Immanuel Kant's first venture into moral philosophy. He argues for an a priori basis for morality, which means knowledge independent of experience. The preface begins with breaking down Greek philosophy into 3 parts. Logic is the study of thought. Physics is the study of how things happen in the world. Ethics is the study of how things ought to happen in the world of human beings. It goes on to say that philosophy can also be broken down into either "pure" or "empirical." Pure deals without experience, while empirical deals with the objects we experience around us. In this book we will be looking from the pure view.

Kant will identify the basic principles of moral philosophy that occur tot us without any experience. He will also be critical of philosophers that don't believe this. Kant states that we make intuitions about morality and that we assume that moral actions work for people all the time, which may not be true. We, as human beings, have to use moral laws in every aspect of life. Kant says that it is important that we develop a clear understanding of moral principles so that we can keep our moral responsibilities in check.

Kant has a similar view of morals as Aristotle had. He believes actions are not truly moral if they only appear to be moral but don't have the right intentions behind them. Like Aristotle, who believed that a virtuous person couldn't be virtuous unless he had the right intention behind the action.

According to Kant, human nature - that is, being hungry, tired, etc – should not have an effect in moral decisions. We need a universally applicable concept. The term a priori is extremely important in understanding how Kant would like us to understand moral philosophy. No experience is necessary in his mind. Kant believes in rational ideas that makes sense to all people, but he wants to make these stronger.

Should morals be the same across the world? Should everyone be treated the same? For that matter should all laws be treated the same? Why in Iraq are women treated so unfairly when in America they would be treating differently? Why in Texas would I get the death penalty for a crime, when in Alaska I wouldn't for the same crime?

The goal of Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals is to establish the "Supreme principle of morality."

Critical Thinking and Electronic Texts: Distraction

I am including below a link to a blog on the NYTimes with a debate, of sorts, between a number of literacy and technology experts on the topic of electronic reading. This is something that has fascinated me for a while, because I am something of a bibliophile. I think I am finally at the point where I could narrate what I take to be an interesting account of learning how to read. Obviously, by the latter I don't simply mean the interpretation of the words on the screen or on the page, but the active engagement with a text, which is really what reading is all about.

The debate on electronic versus paper reading would seem to be a simple, at first glance: do people have a more difficult or an easier time in reading from a screen? But in fact there are a number of related questions about the process of reading--the comprehension and "active engagement," as I put it above, with the text, which are affected by the difference in medium. In particular, these experts seem agreed that there is a tendency to distraction and a dramatically shortened attention span that attends reading from a screen. This is partially an effect of our experience of reading hypertext, on sites like the NY Times or Wikipedia or whatnot, which in knowledge is always produced in small, quickly consumable segments. But a novel or a book of philosophy requires something quite different.

Check it out:
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/does-the-brain-like-e-books/

I would be curious to hear your opinions, particularly since probably most of you have grown up in this digital environment ...

Debating Legitimacy

The argument surrounding non-lifesaving operations on children has two logical sides. Some people feel that these operations are ethically legitimate because it is in the child’s best interest to have them done. Those opposed to these operations believe that it is illegitimate because we are changing the child from who they were born as so that they can fit the superficial standards set by today’s society.

Those who believe that a procedure that enhances or allows for better functioning of a child’s body is legitimate have a few different reasons for their opinion. Though a procedure is a non-life saving operation, it will most likely better the child’s life in the future. If a child is born with a deformity and does not have any operations, they will most likely go on and live a life with some more troubles than other people. They will most likely grow up having difficulties doing daily tasks and may become self-conscious which will lead to many social issues in the future and as the child grows up he or she may not be able to function in society as well as someone who was born without a deformity. As Aristotle said, we cannot reach happiness if we are not successful and if we do not have friends. If we have the tools and the knowledge to do a procedure that would yield substantial benefits for the child in the future, then why not go through with the procedure? Why should this child suffer because of how they were born? Wouldn’t it instead be ethically illegitimate if we have the power to improve a child’s life and we do not do anything about it?

The opposite side of this argument is very understandable as well. These people believe that we are born the way we are, and that is how God intended us to be. We are each unique and each have varying amounts of imperfection, some may just have more than others. They feel that the child is too young to undergo a procedure in which they have no say in the matter and that changes them from the person they were born as. They also feel that just as it is not ethically legitimate for these procedures, it is not ethically legitimate to judge the people who were born with whatever it is that makes parents want to make a change. They feel that the problem is in society, not in how the child was born; that the pleasures associated with being “normal” are socially molded and thus not ethically legitimate. We should accept everyone as who they are and then there would not be a push for operations on children to enhance them. They also may feel that there is too much risk involved in a procedure that is not being done to save a life.

I think that one’s stance on this topic has a lot to do with today’s society vs. traditional teaching. Those people who are for the procedures think that it is legitimate because we have the knowledge and the abilities to improve a child’s life not only now, but in the future as well. Others think that it is ethically illegitimate because we are changing children from who they were born as and who they were meant to be, and most of the time it is because our society will not accept them otherwise.

Superman

In After Virtue, MacIntyre primarily discusses the implications of Nietzschean philosophy with some comparisons to Aristotelian philosophy. In order to comprehend Nietzschean philosophy, one must first understand what the Übermensch is. The Nietzschean man, the Übermensch, and ‘the great man’ are all similar names for someone who doesn’t look to the community for virtues, but looks for them inside himself (257). By not learning from the examples set out by others, and isolating himself, he doesn’t find any good outside of himself.
We know that in order to be virtuous according to Aristotle, one must fulfill the prerequisites of virtue; one of which is community. The Aristotelian point of view is that people find virtue in those that surround them; therefore; someone who has no community to live in cannot have virtue. Virtue is linked to the relationships that one has with others, but the person who is essentially “the best” and cannot learn anything from anyone else, and must look to himself as the person to strive to be. ‘The great man’ is someone that is his own self sufficient moral authority (258).
MacIntyre later breaks down the Nietzschean ‘great man’ by describing it as a pseudo-concept. MacIntyre believes that the Nietzschean stance is not an actual alternative to individualistic livelihood, but the representation of the creation of a true alternative (259). He doesn’t fully support one side or the other, but he does show the short comings in each philosophy. He indicates that he enjoys the notion of a liberal individualistic viewpoint, but doesn’t fully agree with Nietzsche’s stance. He implies that though the Aristotelian tradition is intelligent and rational, but it is not one that he would choose. His final thoughts are that he likes and understands both arguments, but presents the third option of Marxism. When true Marxist socialism does not become turn to democracy or tyranny, then the Nietzschean ideal would work perfectly.
What is thought provoking is why MacIntyre chooses not to make a concrete decision on which philosophical ideal he follows. Is it possible to reconcile the differences between the Nietzschean and Aristotelian ideals and combine the two to create a single coherent idea or are they so inherently different that they cannot be reconciled? Is MacIntyre’s inclusion of the Marxist point of view simplify or complicate the differences between the two? MacIntyre provides a unique perspective on the works of these two philosophers shedding new light on old ideas.

Virtue Theory

Sorry Professor, your plea for a more interesting title was heard, but I was unable to answer it.

Greg Pence's "Virtue Theory" focuses on the many aspects of virtue and how it affects human behavior and character. Elizabeth Anscombe believes that the older ideas of morality, that one should do something, not because one wants to, but because it is morally right to do it (251), no longer holds true and have been confused with the beliefs of people in modern day. Alasdair MacIntyre adds to this by saying that society has combined and absorbed a plethora of different traditions, causing confusion and conflict in morals. MacIntyre gathers that the meaning of life will come “when a person belongs to a moral tradition which allows for a narrative order of a single life” (251), and not by jumbling many different beliefs together. Virtues can only thrive in particular types of societies, not all.

Many contributions were made in the history of ethics, in hopes of better understanding virtue theory. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle focused on virtues as the issue of ethics, studied the few major virtues (courage, wisdom, justice), and ranked the types of characters. Thomas Aquinas builds on their major virtues by adding, what he calls, the ‘theological virtues’ – faith, hope, and charity. Immanuel Kant tried to determine the core of moral character and virtue through examination of reason. Kant believed that completely rational people are virtuous because of a respect for a ‘universalizable’ moral law (252). However, this theory would negate any belief that people act virtuously by character. Susan Wolf says that, should a person really act in the way Kant describes, this person will have a dull, limited life.

Pence goes on to talk about courage and brings up two questions: if it is possible for one to be courageous without knowing specifically what courage is, and whether or not courage was connected to things like virtue or knowledge (253). Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle argue that courage is unaffected and not measured by time. They argue that it was not merely a trait that allowed one to overcome just any fear/obstacle, but worthy obstacles.

Reading on, it talks about ‘eliminatism’ and ‘essentialism. Anscombe and MacIntyre’s believe ‘eliminatism’ to be a conjecture that assumes a correct account of virtue would be able to abandon principle-based ethics (253), which Pence summarizes as “whether an ethical theory based entirely on character can do all the work of ethics” (254). Frederich Nietzche says that a person may want to help another for no particular reason, and simply because he/she feels like doing so; this answers Pence’s question: the ideals of character is insufficient to complete the work of ethics. ‘Essentialism’ would be the theory that virtues may not fundamentally share a “master virtue” (255), but they do share a common essence.

The chapter ends by discussing how each virtue rouses feelings, character and society. In turn, society inspires different virtues or vices, and this is based on the disputable claim that people have the ability to mold their character.