"Facebook-Friending": A 'No-No' for Aristotle

In Book Nine of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains friendship and different facets of friendship. According to Aristotle, a friend is “someone who wishes and does goods to a friend for the friend’s own sake” and “one who spends his time with his friend and makes the same choices [and one who] shares his friend’s distresses and enjoyments” (141). This is import for Aristotle because in order for people to be good and have their friends’ best interests in mind, they must be decent people. Miserable people do not have friends who function the same way as the decent person’s friends. They need friends so they can forget about their problems, but they later are filled with regret for being slightly happy. These people obviously are not meant to have friends since they really do not have their friends’ best interests in mind because they can only think of their own self-loathe.

Which brings up another point Aristotle claims: self love is important for maintaining friendships. Since friends share joys and distresses, miserable people cannot participate in such practices because they do not love themselves; therefore, they do not have the any joys to share. (Even though they would have distresses, they would not share them with friends because the reason they keep friends is to forget their troubles.)

Aristotle explains why friendships are important and just how many friends one should have in chapters nine and ten. He refers to an earlier part of the Nicomachean Ethics when he explains that everyone needs other people in order to be happy. This point is reiterated as he explains that even the person who has all goods and leads a pleasant cannot be happy without friends: “the solitary person’s life is hard, since it is not easy for him to be continuously active all by himself; but in relation to others and in their company” (149). It makes sense because one would expect that people who have everything would need people to share it with. But, Aristotle says close friendships may only be shared with a few people because it is impossible to be very close to so many people.

The most interesting part of Book Nine for me was Aristotle’s take on conflicts in friendships, friends with dissimilar aims, and especially the dissolution of friends. According to Aristotle, if two people are friends, but one friend matures (while the other does not), the friendship must end because they are on two different levels. However, Aristotle claims that the mature friends “must keep some memory of the familiarity they had” (141).

What intrigued me the most (and inspired the title of this blog post) was in chapter three on the dissolution of friendships when Aristotle wrote “friends are most at odds when they are not friends in the way they think they are” (140). I feel as though it has become a social norm for my generation to arbitrarily become “friends” with each other on-line, even people we could meet in person (i.e.: we attend the same school) however, nothing ever comes to be from this friendship because of the way we perceive this friendship. Most people usually do not pay attention to their Facebook friends, and just have them for fun; I think Aristotle would have a major problem with this because it undermines his entire theory of what friendship is.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999.

Befriending Aristotle: What Exactly is Friendship?

As one progresses through Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, one will stumble upon Book VIII, which basically gives a run down on Aristotle's stance on friendship. We, as the readers, are immediately hit with the statement that "it is most necessary for our life" (Aristotle, 119). What Aristotle is insinuating is that friendship is a necessary part of any tolerable human life. To further strengthen his point, Aristotle mentions that how can one possibly become a rich and holder of power positions if they have no opportunity for beneficence in relation to friends? Aristotle also mentions that not only is friendship necessary, but it is also "fine" (Aristotle, 120). We are led to believe that a friendship is praiseworthy; a friendship must consist of some type of goodwill between two people. The goodwill must be reciprocated goodwill, meaning that both people involved in the friendship have the same mutual feelings towards one another, each person should wish "good" (Aristotle, 121) to the friendship, and each person should be aware of the goodwill or else the friendship is nullified. For example, John and Bob can share the same mutual feelings towards one another but if this is not expressed by either John or Bob, the friendship is void.

Aristotle proceeds by then elaborating on three different types of friendship: utility, pleasure, and goodness. A friendship based on utility is when each person provides "some type of good" (Aristotle, 121) or benefits to the friendship. John and Bob can have a friendship based on some type of good but if, for example, John fails to provide this good, the friendship is over; thus these types of friendships normally do not last. A friendship based on pleasure is quite similar to one based on utility but instead, both friends are attracted to one another due to looks, personalities, etc. Again, these friendships are normally truncated due to their reliance on personal utilities and pleasures (utilities and pleasures are prone to change). The third type, however, is defined as the epitome of friendships: both people admire each other's goodness and strive to maintain the goodness. These friends are "friends without qualification" (Aristotle, 124), unlike friendships based on utility and pleasure. Goodness is what maintains friendships and in order to preserve the goodness, all persons must be able to also dish out compliments rather than just accepting them. I personally agree with Aristotle in that friendships should be based on goodness because a friendship based on looks or a certain object is completely faulty. If a friendship existed due to looks and one of the friends got into a serious accident (thus damaging the friend's looks), what would happen to the friendship? The foundation of a solid friendship is goodness and without that affection towards each other, the friendship might as well cease to exist. In this day and age, we are indeed materialistic and we may have a tendency to befriend those with money and innovative objects, but we must overlook this materialistic facade and focus on finding those who will persist a friendship due to goodness and selflessness.

Aristotle concludes his eighth book by mentioning friendship in communities and different political systems. He basically says that both justice and friendships are closely related and that they both tie communities together. "Justice also naturally increases with friendship, since it involves the same people and extends over an equal area" (Aristotle, 129). Attacking or robbing a random stranger is considered unjust but performing those actions on a close companion, like your mother or brother, is considered the highest degree of unjustness. Aristotle then ties communities with different political systems, such as monarchy, aristocracy, and timocracy. Corrupt political systems (tyranny, for example, a corrupt form of monarchy) are like those relationships where no friendship exists. The relationship between the ruler and his or her people is so apart that a friendship between each party cannot be established. I agree with Aristotle that in order for a political community to survive and strive, there must be some type of relationship between the ruler and his or her people. The ruler must provide the people with rights, benefits, and must also take good care of the people. Justice and friendships among those in the community must also be prevalent or else it will face dire consequences.

A Plea for More Creative Titles

Somehow, a title which simply refers to the title of the text that we are reading just does not titillate the potential reader. Or me, an actual reader. So I make this plea for more creative, specific, mysterious titles.

Incontinence Book Seven; 1-10

Aristotle’s main goal in his seventh book of Nicomachean Ethics is to discuss the idea of incontinence. Before we can discuss incontinence, we first must understand what Aristotle’s idea of incontinence entails. In Aristotle’s definition, “ an incontinence person knows that his actions are base, but does them because of his feelings.” Essentially, Aristotle is saying that an incontinent person is someone who knows what is right and good for them, but they fail to do the good. The failure to do this good is usually the result of their appetites and pleasures.

In the text Aristotle gives the reader the important distinction between intemperance and incontinence. The main difference between these two terms is that the intemperate person has come to a decision and policy of pursuing the bodily pleasure before him, while someone who is incontinence does not make that same decision. Aristotle later goes on to say that intemperance is worse than incontinence because an intemperate person is not prone to regret, while an incontinent person regrets their actions. We next move to the distinction between spirit incontinence and appetite incontinence. Incontinence of spirit is because of the spirit’s natural “hot and hastiness”. In other words, when we act because of spirit it is that we have a belief that we are acting in the right, and we are not being motivated by pleasure in pain. In the instance of appetite incontinence, we are acting purely because of a reason or perception that something will be pleasant, and we rush off to savor the resultant gratification of that action. Aristotle considers the idea of spiritual incontinence a much more innocent form because we are acting in what we think is right, instead of looking for an instance gratification.

Not only does Aristotle make this distinction, he also makes the important distinction between different types of incontinent people. Two types of incontinent people that Aristotle mentions are those with impetuosity and those with weakness. After much debate, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that the ones whose temper is quick to flare, the impetuous, are a better type than of incontinent than the weak. Since the impetuous are lead on by feelings and do not have time to deliberate, while the weak person deliberates but then his feelings make him abandon his deliberation, Aristotle finds the impetuous are more acceptable type of incontinence. Even though he considers one type of incontinence better than the other, he still thinks that incontinence is something that is curable by deliberation, whereas an intemperate person is incurable.

In many of Aristotle’s points, I must say that I agree with his statements throughout the text. One of the better points I think he makes concerns the idea of incontinence of spirit and the incontinence of appetite. When humans act out of spirit, we are usually trying to do what we believe has some form of rightness, while on the other hand when we act out of appetite we are mostly being moved by pain or pleasure. Though they are both types of incontinence, the incontinence of spirit is a more human reaction, while appetite is more of a bestial type of incontinence.

Aristotle’s point that a person burdened with impetuosity is a more acceptable type of incontinent is quite valid. Those that are the impetuous types can learn to control their incontinence by giving thought to what they say or do before acting. In the case of the person burdened with weakness these types of people have already deliberated but then their inability to act on their deliberations and a deference to baser needs causes a much more difficult problem to overcome. It is far easier for an impetuous person to change their ways than someone who carries the burden of weakness. Since these are just my extrapolations based on the text, I am interested to see what anyone else thought of what Aristotle said about these issues. I would appreciate any comments.

Pleasure: Book 10: 1-5

According to Aristotle, Happiness is the final good in which people strive for in life. So how does pleasure play a part in this, if at all?

Aristotle uses Chapters 1-5 in book 10 to discuss several interesting parts of pleasure. He begins with the correct approach people should have towards pleasure, and even pain to some extent. This leads to arguments about pleasure, and then the distinction of how pleasure is a good, but not the good. He then shows how pleasure completes an activity and should not be thought of as a process.

Chapter one begins with the argument of whether of whether pleasure is the good or an “altogether base” (153). This idea in a way extends throughout Book 10 because Aristotle is constantly questioning the relationship between pleasure and the good, and how to accurately describe pleasure. Aristotle mentions Eudoxus in Chapter 2 to show the argument that pleasure is the good; he reasons that every living creature strives to make choices based on pleasure that will result in happiness, thus making it the most desired and ultimately the good. Yet, Aristotle argues that pleasure is not the good, but rather a good. We know from our earlier reading and class discussions that Aristotle believes happiness to be the final good, and he then shows Plato’s idea to illustrate how Eudoxus is incorrect. From my understanding, Plato understands pleasure to be a good that can be added to another good to achieve more happiness, which would not make it the final good, but just a good.

Aristotle expands on pleasure being a good and not the good in Chapter 3. He concludes that, “ the good is definite, whereas pleasure is indefinite because it admits of more and less” (155). This idea that there are different degrees of pleasure that people experience and achieve is also mentioned in Chapter 5. Aristotle also ties back in the notion of pain, and shows that people do not experience the same pleasure from some things; for example, eating strawberries provides pleasure to some people, while others can experience extreme pain because they are allergic.

For Aristotle, pleasure is seen more as an activity. Towards the end of Chapter 3, Aristotle concludes that the notion some people carry about pleasure being a becoming or process is wrong. He concludes in Chapter 4 that pleasure is “complete at any time” (158) which is simply not true about something that is being characterized as a process. And because it is complete, it can also be considered a whole, so then it cannot be in the state of becoming. He instead believes pleasure to complete an activity.

In the end, I think Aristotle does an excellent job showing the different characteristics of pleasure and is able to answer the question of why do people strive for pleasure. His response is that through pleasure, people are allowed to complete their activities, which results in a complete life; and this complete life allows it to be choiceworthy, and result in the person being happy. And, in the end, happiness is the good that everyone is striving for attaining (159), therefore showing how pivotal pleasure, as the concept of completing an activity, is to achieving the final good of happiness.

What are pleasures? (Book 7;11-14)

            In chapters 11-14 of book 7, Aristotle talks about some important aspects of pleasure. He first addresses some common questions about pleasure. He then talks about whether pleasure can be classified as a good and what category it falls under if it is not a good. Later, Aristotle talks about the relationship between pleasure and happiness. Finally, Aristotle ends book 7 by discussing bodily pleasures.

            According to Aristotle, there are three popular views of pleasure. First, is that no pleasure is a good. Second, is that some pleasures may be good but most are bad. Last, is that even if every pleasure is a good; the best good cannot be pleasure. This is obviously true because Aristotle has already established that happiness is the highest good. As for pleasure, Aristotle does not believe it can be considered a good because it “is a perceived becoming toward [the fulfillment of something’s] nature.” He adds that pleasure does not have a certain craft. To help us understand this concept, Aristotle uses an example of a house. The process of building a house is considered the craft of the final complete house. Therefore, since every good must have a craft, pleasure cannot be considered a good because it lacks a craft.

            In chapter 12, Aristotle takes our understanding of pleasure a bit further. Previously, Aristotle had claimed that pleasure was a “perceived becoming.” Now he claims that “pleasures are not becomings, nor do they all even involve a becoming. They are activities, and an end [in themselves]…” Aristotle insists that becomings are different from activities but I failed to comprehend this and I welcome anyone to help me understand the difference between the two. However, one thing I did understand was Aristotle’s comments on how some pleasures are ends of themselves. For example, when a person wins the lottery, the pleasure they feel has no other goal or aim than just itself. For this reason we cannot classify all pleasures as just activities.

            In chapter 13, Aristotle discusses the similarities between pleasure and happiness. He makes an argument for how pleasure can be considered a good. He says it makes sense for people to associate pleasure with happiness because they assume the “happy life” is pleasant. He later adds that pleasure might in fact be the best good for why else would humans and beasts pursue it. This does make sense because people commit actions every day in the hope of it bringing them happiness or pleasure. If pleasure is not a good, we cannot associate it with happiness, which is a good. And if there is no pleasure in happiness, what’s the point of being happy?

            Bodily pleasures are another one of Aristotle’s interesting concepts. He explains why people pursue them. He states, “some pleasures are the actions of a base nature…or base because of habit, such as the actions of base human beings.” For instance, the bodily pleasure we feel when we eat is part of our nature. According to Aristotle, another way humans feel unintentional bodily pleasures are when they are recovering from an injury or an illness. An example, of this would be the bodily pleasures that people feel when they are recovering in a hospital. According to Aristotle, those who cannot enjoy these two types of natural bodily pleasures feel the need to pursue other types of bodily pleasures that might satisfy whatever desires they may have.    

           

 

                        

Nicomachean Ethics Book III

In the first chapter of Book III, Aristotle discusses and attempts to define involuntary and voluntary actions. The determination of voluntary or involuntary is important in determining whether an action is virtuous according to Aristotle's definition. Virtue only consists of voluntary actions and thus being virtuous is entirely up to the individual. This is not however the same as saying every individual can be virtuous. Aristotle also notes that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary is important in the making of legislation.

Involuntary actions, according to Aristotle are either forced by an external principle, in which the agent contributes nothing, or caused by ignorance. The example for this source of involuntary action is the wind blowing a person through a window. In this case, “the agent”, the person contributes nothing, and is forced by the external principle of the wind. I wonder, does a situation in which an individual acts on something accidently count as involuntary? Does a person who while driving in their car accidently hits somebody (and it’s the drivers fault) deserve some reprimand? To what extent does intent matter when determining what is voluntary or involuntary?

However, situations in which the agent is forced to commit actions by either a positive or negative source are “mixed” but considered voluntary. This means that such actions are subject to either praise or shame, can be virtuous and can be punishable by legislation. An example of this sort of action would be if a tyrant threatens you by demanding that you do something shameful or else he will kill your family. In such situations, one is responsible for his/her own actions and thus must weigh the good vs. the bad in making each decision in order to reach a virtuous outcome. I believe that by killing one innocent person in order to save 1,000 innocent people from certain death, one is voluntary and acting virtuously. Should it still be illegal to kill someone in order to save others? Are we in the right to make decisions on life or death as mere human beings? What is the virtuous course of action?

Another important distinction comes in the statement; actions which are done in ignorance but not by ignorance are voluntary. For example, committing an action in a drunken stupor or out of rage is considered voluntary. Lastly, one cannot claim that their actions are merely a result of their spirit and appetite and thus are involuntary. The idea of intent is important when discussing these types of situations. What interests me most about this chapter is the idea of ignorance. In my opinion, an ignorant mother, who drinks during her pregnancy because she has never heard that drinking does harm to the unborn child is still at fault because her ignorance is inexcusable. Like in the case of the drunk, the woman’s ignorance is caused be her own fault, her lack of research into the birthing process. The only acceptable ignorance is that of an innocent child and all other forms of ignorance are the fault of the person’s inadequacies. Others may disagree with me and say, a person who grows up in a society that teaches wrong practices has no choice but to act in that manner. My response is that these people have no chance of being virtuous and that is why Aristotle says only a virtuous society can produce virtuous people.

In the second chapter, Aristotle discusses decision which to him seems “most proper in virtue.” Decision is a more specific subset of voluntary action, which excludes children and animals. Decision involves rational and reason. Aristotle goes on to explain that decision is not appetite, wish or belief. I agree with Aristotle that decision is key factor in virtue. If someone only saves a bus of children in order to be famous then they are acting on appetite and not decision and are not acting virtuously. However, this chapter almost seems to contradict Aristotle’s earlier beliefs that virtue is not something that you have to think about but something you just do.

Musings on Happiness

As all who cracked open their copies of Nicomachean Ethics know quite well, the issue of happiness is one that is discussed at length, and one of staggering complexity as well. With issues ranging from what can be defined as good to what kind(s) of good comprise happiness and and what capacities, Aristotle's lengthy writings on teh subject shed a new (albeit complicated) light on a concept which is known of by nearly all, but, we learn, truly understood by very few.
As I read the first twelve chapters of Book 1, I became intrigued by Aristotle's discourses on the role of action in the achievement of happiness. About halfway through the reading (and also, to an extent, in the first few paragraphs), Aristotle describes at length the role of actions in both reaching "the good" and in cultivating personal happiness. Aristotle states that, in order for happiness to be reached, actions must be aimed at the highest good. This highest good differs from action to action; in military science, it may be victory, in medicine, health, etc. But through all of the particulars described, the necessity of action remains a pervasive theme.
This sparked a few questions with me as I read. As action was continually discussed, I began to consider its role in happiness with respect to the good that it aimed at. It seemed as if the analagous and dialectical relationship between the two suggested a relationship of potentiality and actuality, with good existing in a state of potentiality, and happiness being a product of its being brought into actuality through virtuous actions. Although Aristotle rejects the concept of a Platonic "form" of happiness, it is nonetheless an intangible quality of certain things, and therefore action must be taken to reach it. Take, for example, a person who is born with a highly generous spirit and, by good fortune, is afforded a great deal of wealth when they are born. If this person never chooses to act on the generous spirit that they harbor, then it is an entirely negligible and useless quality. Though it may be good in and of itself, it exists only as the potential for good, and therefore requires action to bring said good into actuality.

This is all basically spur-of-the-moment conjecture, so please comment with any ideas that may support these thoughts, or illuminate their flaws and shortcomings.

Nicomachean Ethics, Bks. 1:13, 2

In the last chapter of Book 1 in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle introduces the importance of studying virtue. Since Aristotle’s main investigation is upon happiness, which is a specific activity of the soul that depends upon virtue, he concludes that the study of virtue is essential in better understanding happiness. In particular, Aristotle examines human virtue, or “virtue of the soul” (16), given that his main investigation pertains to human good and human happiness. In Book 2, he conveys the premises of his conclusion, which are that the correct habituation of virtuous actions, the correct balance between extremities, and the correct response to the elements of pleasure and pain compose the virtue of happiness.

The first two premises explain the conditions by which virtues can develop or be corrupted. Virtues develop through correct habituation. Correct habituation entails repeating right actions, which are determined by right reasons or knowledge. In doing so, one develops and improves the state of one’s character. However, virtues and states can be corrupted when lacking proper resources, as a teacher, and when virtues are performed in the most extreme ways. Aristotle conveys that a man becomes cowardly or rash, which are the extremities of bravery, when his actions are a deficiency or an excess of the virtue of bravery. Thus, a balance between extremities, or a mean, is needed to maintain a virtue (19-20).

To understand virtue and being virtuous, the relation of pleasure and pain to virtue, which is the third premise, is vital. Aristotle conveys that every action and feeling has the element of pleasure or pain. Because virtues concentrate upon actions and feelings, then they also focus on pleasure and pain. Hence, one’s state relies upon one’s response to pleasure or pain. Through proper upbringing, one experiences pleasure or pain in the correct instances and is therefore able to act virtuously (21). Moreover, a person is considered virtuous if: they know they’ve performed a virtuous act, they have decided to perform a virtuous act solely because it is virtuous, and if they are confident in the actions (22). Conclusively, virtue is a state, as opposed to a feeling or capacity, because it is both the way one is in relation to pleasure or pain and the type of capacity one has with their feelings.

Now, one wonders how the premises and conclusion upon the virtue of happiness correlate with Aristotle’s view of happiness. Since happiness is “one of those activities that are choiceworthy in their own right” (162), then the aspects of being choiceworthy must be examined. An activity is choiceworthy when it is fundamentally right and independent of incentives. Hence, the premises of virtue are an essential part of knowing and performing what is choiceworthy because the premises of virtue allow one to act through pure and civilized pleasure (162). Thus, the premises constitute choiceworthy activity, which ultimately leads to happiness.

Thus, can a person be virtuous and therefore happy if they possess only one of the premises of virtue? I believe not because virtue is a composite of all the premises and in a way the premises intertwine to form the abstract idea of virtue. Virtuous actions are marked by several criteria, which are previously noted, and therefore one cannot be virtuous if they do not satisfy all of the criteria of virtue.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Company, 1999.

Nicomachean Ethics, Bks 1:1-12

In book one, chapters one to twelve of Nicomachean Ethics Aristole’s chief design is to unravel what is good and how an individual arrives at (through what aims) the ends of such intent.

Aristotle begins by asserting that some good comes from every action (3) therefore our aim is to do well in those precise actions. Although our aim is to achieve goodness there is not a sole end rather the existence of two varying ends. End number one being activities, while end number two falling under the classification of products, in which a natural inclination exists towards the latter.

The end becomes the propelling aim behind our actions (4). It is the end that we are searching for. Good can be achieved through two particular aims: one for the sake of good while the second one for the sake of arriving at a different end. Aristotle thinks that if Chief Good (4) is to be attained one most aim for the sake of good. In view of the fact that one should aim for the sake of good, it should come to no surprise that Aristotle believes that the highest master science is political science because it involves the learning of goodness (of what is good).

It would seem that Aristotle believes that knowledge with the usage of reason is the aid needed by all to act with moderation and self-restraint of feelings (4-5) when acting upon our desires although he does specify there are varying limitations given the specific subject. In Chapter 5 Aristotle returns to examine the aim of political science, which is all that is good in turn making its highest aim – happiness. Happiness involves living well and acting well (5-6) however the masses and philosophers seem to differ in their interpretation.

The masses idea of happiness is a straightforward approach modified solely by a current predicament. For example if they are sick their health is what would make them happy, if poor it would be the accumulation of money that would bring happiness and so forth. On the other hand philosophers identify with the truth as the source of happiness even ignoring one’s attachment to friends in order to ensure truth (7-9).

There are three types of life according to Aristotle: a life of politics, pleasure and contemplation. We perform a certain kind of life or what Aristotle would refer to as characteristic activity (10). This activity of the soul and actions, done with reason, leads to a complete life. It is this activity, which is a characteristic of virtue, that makes happiness not only divine and blessed (15-16) but also virtuous (13-15).

If what is good is happiness and our aim is to find happiness then once happiness is achieved it is lasting. Therefore as Aristotle deciphered happiness, it is something considered among the best, deserving more than praise, deserving quite simply honor because it is noble and complete (19-20).

Is happiness truly the highest aim of good? I think so. Our actions indirectly (although I feel they mostly are directly aimed to bring pleasure) bring happiness to our lives. Once we have achieved that happiness through our actions done with reason should we automatically congratulate ourselves in having achieved it or wait till death … to be sure we were happy? I feel that Aristotle does a great job at dispelling this worry by stating that happiness bears changes in fortune in a noble way.

Aristotle., and Roger Crisp. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy). New York: Cambridge UP, 2000.

Nicomachean Ethics: An Account on Happiness

An individual with a modest life can be happy through his or her own self-sufficiency and intellect. She does not need the notorious lifestyle of the rich and powerful, which today’s media and society glorify, to be happy. Any person, no matter her occupation or status in the world, may arrive at happiness through personal contemplation. Such an answer appears complex, but Aristotle explicates that a happy life “is in accordance with virtue,” (193) and he specifically refers to wisdom (and intellect) as the highest kind of virtue. Ergo, the wiser an individual is the happier she will be.

How can reveling in one’s thoughts and exploring one’s mind result in happiness? What about the seemingly endless list of things that I, or anyone else wants or really seems to need? Humanity takes part in numerous pleasurable activities, hoping to fill an emotional void or to unwind from a taxing schedule. These “pleasurable amusements” do in fact fit in the category of happiness, yet these actions all have endings. Whatever it may be, a vacation in the Bahamas, or a simple walk through Central Park truly provide for a pleasurable time, but eventually come to an end. The individual must return to reality and again choose another bodily pleasure to entertain herself for a while in hopes of arriving at some form of happiness.

 

Contemplation is unique and personal—something that only the individual can enjoy on her own. No one else is able to interact or alter another’s thoughts or ideas. It is personal and secretive; unlike any kind of pleasurable amusement, the activity of intellect “seems superior in its seriousness, to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its own proper pleasure” (195). In other words, a person’s thoughts are endless and without boundaries therefore having no end to its beginning.

Because of contemplation’s “open-endedness,” no person will encounter the same feelings as she may experience when she does something to entertain herself. The inevitable and somewhat sad realization that bodily pleasures must come to a finale is never felt when a person absorbs herself in thought. With personal wisdom, the intellectual is never let down because their contemplation comes from within them and is dependent of anything else.

Aristotle later discusses the importance of society and laws to help individuals understand the importance of self-sufficiency. The way a child is raised (either by his or her parents or by a community) influences his or her ability to understand the idea of a temperate lifestyle, which can successfully lead to a happy life. Many times individuals are taught to believe that power and wealth are the only two things that pave a way to a happy life, but Aristotle encourages people to realize that the most essential requirement for a happy life is their own personal wisdom to continuously engage and apply themselves to the world around them. 

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Company, 1999.

Vulnerability and Enhancements

Today it is commonplace for individuals to spend thousands of dollars on physical and medical enhancements that improve bodily appearance and function.  Plastic surgery, diet pills, liposuction, steroids, and many other treatments and applications are widely used and accepted in our society.  Yet in his essay “Enhancements and the Ethical Significance of Vulnerability,” McKenny highlights philosophical arguments that contradict our modern quest to eliminate bodily vulnerability.

            Vulnerability possessed an ethical significance for ancients, like the Stoics and Aristotle, who desired to pursue virtue rather than bodily perfection.  Since the body inevitably failed humans at the hands of “fortune” (death, disease, etc.), the Stoics focused instead on “self-examination” and “self-mastery” as the path to virtue and fulfillment (227-228).  While they acknowledged a need for bodily health, the Stoics maintained that bodily practices could not contribute to ultimate happiness.  Nothing that was susceptible to the hands of fortune should have been pursued, and enhancements were merely an attempt to gain control of our bodies in a way that only virtue should (226). 

            Aristotle also taught that the pursuit of virtue (happiness) would lead to fulfillment, but he did not discount the merits of everything that was susceptible to fortune as the Stoics did.  For example, Aristotle believed that friendship was essential to happiness yet it was also subject to the whims of fortune (229).  Furthermore, bodily health was necessary to some degree to maintain a virtuous life, and enhancements were acceptable for the severely deprived.

            Finally, McKenny addresses Levinas’ philosophical view of vulnerability.  His ethical conclusion relies on denying the “persistence of being” as the traditional basis of ethics in favor of emphasizing the vulnerable body as the basis for our subjectivity (234).  Levinas also examines the influence that identifying with our vulnerability has on the examination of our duty to the “other.”

            Through the presentation of these arguments regarding the significance of vulnerability, McKenny highlights the fact that modern society has no guidelines for the ethical use of enhancements to diminish this vulnerability (223).  Today, we do not see the benefits of subjecting ourselves to fortune and embracing our vulnerability.  We are only concerned with the limits that our bodies place on us and how we can overcome them.  But if we continue to overcome these limitations with physical and medical enhancements, our human fulfillment will become a “product rather than a process” (227).  The ancient process of enhancement taught virtues like moderation since one had to struggle against the drives of our body: hunger, thirst, sleep, etc.  Yet with our modern enhancements, we do not need to fight against our bodies to achieve its perfection.  If the process of enhancements continues to develop unexamined, perhaps one day we will no longer know sacrifice – a human experience that builds character and strength.  What kind of people will we become when we no longer know sacrifice or moderation?  What moral consequences will this continued denial of our inherent vulnerability have? 

Environmental Ethics

Amaidani Boncenor

In “Environmental Ethics,” Robert Elliot uses the example of Kakadu National Park in Australia, which runs the risk of being cleared for mining to discuss why people might be against the destruction of natural habitats. He makes it clear that regarding the environment; people have different ideas depending on their moral principles, which he calls Environmental Ethics. He goes on to examine some of the different environmental ethics people might have for not supporting the destruction of the park.

The first environmental ethic Elliot examines is the Human-centred ethic, which conveys that the decision should be based solely on how it will affect humans. I found this to be incredibly selfish because someone with this ethic only cares about the wellbeing of the park depending on the services that it provides them with.  Elliot successfully conveys the selfishness of people who have this ethic when he says, “it is only the happiness and unhappiness of humans which is morally considerable” (286). They fail to see the importance of the natural world and the effect it has on their lives.

The second environmental ethic is the Animal-centred ethic. This ethic regards both humans and animals as morally considerable in environmental issues, but not as equals. For example, it would be unacceptable if a decision protected animals and harmed humans, but it would be okay if it were vice versa. Elliot explains that this “ranking” is based on how complicated the species is, and refers to the complexity in thought between humans and kangaroos.  I understand that humans are more valuable because of their intelligence, but kangaroos should not be devalued to the point where they are insignificant. Kangaroos are an important part of the ecosystem because, like all animals, they help keep the food chain balanced.

The Life-centred ethic is very similar to the Animal-centred ethic. However, this ethic takes into consideration all the living things in the biosphere. Once again, the complexity of the living thing is what decides its moral significance. I do not believe its complexity should be valued, but rather its contribution to the environment, just like the case with humans and kangaroos. In the end, all the inhabitants work together in a chain.

After discussing the last three ethics, Elliot realizes that they all place a great importance on life. Elliot then develops the “Everything Ethic” which regards both living things and non-living things, such as rocks, as important.  I think this is a very unique ethic because when people think about the environment, they always think about different life-forms that need protection. Rarely do non-living things, such as rocks, get recognized. According to Elliot, “Mining will involve smashing up rocks, disturbing geological structures, spoiling fossils and the like” (288). This made me realize that every single feature of the Kakadu Park, no matter how small, is very important to its wellbeing and nothing should be “ranked” because everything works together.

In the last ethic, the Ecological Holism ethic, the living and non-living inhabitants are only important depending on how they contribute to the maintenance of the environment. I agree with this ethic because it values every species for its abilities regardless of complexity. It places a special importance on the environment and its continuity.

Although Elliot fails to choose one specific environmental ethic to handle the Kakadu Park issue, he still manages to convey that everything (living and non-living) is important in making the decision. I believe that a combination of the "Everything Ethic" and the Human-centred ethic would be appropriate in deciding to stop the mining of Kakadu Park. Both humans and everything in the park should be taken into consideration equally when making the decision because it will ultimately affect them both.

 

 

            

On Belliotti's "Sex"

Philosophical Ethics, Fall 2009

Caitlin Meyer

Most of us will attest to living in a sex-filled society. We see it everywhere: Glance up at a billboard advertising beer or clothing; pick up a copy of Cosmopolitan Magazine; or simply attend one college party. Sex is everywhere. Yet, interestingly enough, most of us will agree that we have been taught to temper our sexual desire--whether by religious organizations, health classes, or other societal constructs. So why is sex as prevalent as Chase ATMs, but as reprehensible as robbery? Raymond Belliotti’s article, “Sex,” attempts to unpack sex’s timeless ethical complexities, and it provides insight into how our Western society has arrived at various conclusions regarding sex and sexual relationships. Belliotti first approaches sex philosophically, by outlining dualism as influenced by Pythagoras, Plato, and later Stoics (315). Next, he explains how these philosophers influenced Judeo-Christian attitudes towards sex, noting that the resulting religious dogma significantly contributed to current Western opinions (316). After elucidating Judeo-Christian thought, Belliotti examines the commonly-held belief that sex is a moral act, only tolerable in instances of love and intimacy (318). Belliotti then dissects his subject with four different ideological knives, investigating sex through the lenses of Libertarianism, Kantian thought, Marxism and Feminism (319-323). He considers libertarian sexual ideology, as adapted by Kant, to be the most “persuasive” (325). Because we attend a religious school that focuses heavily on the study of philosophy, I will briefly explain dualism and religious perspectives on sex; then I will draw conclusions, touching briefly upon feminism, and presenting a series of critiques.

The concept of dualism, which was formed nearly five centuries before the birth of Jesus (315), is the idea that humans are composed of an immortal soul that is inhibited by a mortal body. As adherents to dualism, Pythagoreans, Plato and Stoics agreed that humans must practice certain philosophic virtues to prepare them to transcend their bodily prisons. Plato and his posse believed that repressing bodily desires would prepare them, at death, or separation of body and soul, to unite their immortal cores with the most real of all things: the immaterial Universal Truths (D'Attore 2009). In short, bodies and all physical bodily urges were viewed as scornful barriers, which only hindered the pure, immortal soul.

It is no surprise that with this sort of influence, modern Judeo-Christian thought is tainted with a fear of bodily urges. Belliotti unloads the role of sex in the Church according to St. Paul (316), beginning with Adam and Eve. He tells us that before Adam and Eve, sex was controlled by the mind (317). When Adam and Eve gave in to their bodily desire, sexual longing was “tainted with evil” (317); thus explaining Jesus’ Immaculate Conception. In the Catholic and Protestant churches today, sex is “morally permissible” only if it occurs within marriage, and does not deliberately prohibit reproduction.

Wait--why is sex only authorized under these terms? Why was Adam and Eve’s adherence to bodily aspirations so nefarious? If the body and soul (or mind) really are two separate entities (they very well may not be!), why must the mind control and repress bodily desires? “To unite with the Universal Truths,” some would say. “To gain eternal salvation,” others would argue. But what if these most perfect realms do not actually exist? Is it necessary to try to control or ignore the messages our bodies send us? If so, which should we stifle? When our stomachs ache due to starvation, should we not eat? This question will invite scrutiny, because some will say that sex, unlike starvation, is not a matter of life or death; and some will say that sex, unlike eating, is a mere indulgence. But is it really?

We are left wondering: Why so much discussion about sex? Is it really so central to our core, to our personalities and to our happiness, that we must apply to it strict religious, philosophical and ideological standards that we may not apply to other basic human activity? Even feminists, alleged sources of female liberation and power, base their entire ideology around women as sexually-acquiescent victims of a male-dominated society (324). Isn’t there a little more to womanhood, to personhood?

I’d say so.

Bibliography

Note:parenthetical citations without author's name pertain to the following author

Belliotti, Raymond, A. "Sex" A Companion to Ethics 315-326

D'Attore, Prof. Mary, recorded by Caitlin Meyer. Philosophy of Human Nature, Class Notes. (March 2009).

Morality and Personal Relationships

Hugh Lafollette has made some observations regarding morality and personal relationship based upon previous philosopher's propositions that the two are conflicting. According to his interpretation of the popular conception of the word morality, it must require being impartial towards everyone. However, he says personal relationships are partial (his later example is that someone would save their wife before they would save a stranger).

In the following paragraphs he presents two opinions: one is that there is no conflict and morality simply governs that you should be partial towards those you are intimate with while the other is that the requirement of impartiality undermines personal relationships (they conflict). Impartiality undermines personal relationships because it requires that you are impartial to all people you are intimate with, when in reality you would treat different people differently.

He goes on to say that morality should attempt “to diminish, if not eradicate, the undesirable effects of luck,” which has presented people with inequality (Lafollette). Considering an idea by J. Rachels that says we have duties to be universally impartial he explains that complete impartiality would eliminate personal relationships. Befriending people would not be based on a certain chemistry, it would be due to a moral rule requiring impartiality.

It is finally decided that they are not conflicting, they are mutually supportive of one another. Morality cannot be possible without personal relationships to teach you things such as empathy and close personal relationships require moral people who can trust each other and are interested in the welfare of others.

One thing that caught my eye was his comment that “impartial moral principles dictate that we pursue intimacy,” (Lafollette). I find this to be far fetched. He does not say intimacy is the only way to achieve certain ideals such as loyalty and honesty. So why would morality dictate specifically to pursue intimacy for these ideals? Is it possible to achieve this ideals without intimacy? In that case this could be used to argue that morality and personal relationships do conflict and are possibly even mutually exclusive. He goes on to discuss another problem of how to treat intimates equally, but does not discuss the statement of pursuing intimacy any further.

I think it is obvious that morality and personal relationships sometimes conflict, but rarely to the point of one eliminating the other completely. Sometimes placing morality over loyalty to a friend can result in a disagreement, but the relationship will not necessarily fail. I think to even suggest that they are not possible together is a ridiculous statement because it is obvious to me, from life experience, that they coexist quite effortlessly. Saying that they are supportive of one another and help cause one another I feel is the same as saying that people grow to be better people from life experiences.