In the last chapter of Book 1 in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle introduces the importance of studying virtue. Since Aristotle’s main investigation is upon happiness, which is a specific activity of the soul that depends upon virtue, he concludes that the study of virtue is essential in better understanding happiness. In particular, Aristotle examines human virtue, or “virtue of the soul” (16), given that his main investigation pertains to human good and human happiness. In Book 2, he conveys the premises of his conclusion, which are that the correct habituation of virtuous actions, the correct balance between extremities, and the correct response to the elements of pleasure and pain compose the virtue of happiness.
The first two premises explain the conditions by which virtues can develop or be corrupted. Virtues develop through correct habituation. Correct habituation entails repeating right actions, which are determined by right reasons or knowledge. In doing so, one develops and improves the state of one’s character. However, virtues and states can be corrupted when lacking proper resources, as a teacher, and when virtues are performed in the most extreme ways. Aristotle conveys that a man becomes cowardly or rash, which are the extremities of bravery, when his actions are a deficiency or an excess of the virtue of bravery. Thus, a balance between extremities, or a mean, is needed to maintain a virtue (19-20).
To understand virtue and being virtuous, the relation of pleasure and pain to virtue, which is the third premise, is vital. Aristotle conveys that every action and feeling has the element of pleasure or pain. Because virtues concentrate upon actions and feelings, then they also focus on pleasure and pain. Hence, one’s state relies upon one’s response to pleasure or pain. Through proper upbringing, one experiences pleasure or pain in the correct instances and is therefore able to act virtuously (21). Moreover, a person is considered virtuous if: they know they’ve performed a virtuous act, they have decided to perform a virtuous act solely because it is virtuous, and if they are confident in the actions (22). Conclusively, virtue is a state, as opposed to a feeling or capacity, because it is both the way one is in relation to pleasure or pain and the type of capacity one has with their feelings.
Now, one wonders how the premises and conclusion upon the virtue of happiness correlate with Aristotle’s view of happiness. Since happiness is “one of those activities that are choiceworthy in their own right” (162), then the aspects of being choiceworthy must be examined. An activity is choiceworthy when it is fundamentally right and independent of incentives. Hence, the premises of virtue are an essential part of knowing and performing what is choiceworthy because the premises of virtue allow one to act through pure and civilized pleasure (162). Thus, the premises constitute choiceworthy activity, which ultimately leads to happiness.
Thus, can a person be virtuous and therefore happy if they possess only one of the premises of virtue? I believe not because virtue is a composite of all the premises and in a way the premises intertwine to form the abstract idea of virtue. Virtuous actions are marked by several criteria, which are previously noted, and therefore one cannot be virtuous if they do not satisfy all of the criteria of virtue.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett Company, 1999.
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